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I. INTRODUCTION
As criminal defense lawyers and prosecutors well know, fourth
amendment law is constantly evolving and constantly being modified
by the Supreme Court of the United States. This Article provides an
up-to-date rendition of the status and trends in fourth amendment law
as interpreted by the Court. The purpose is a modest one: to provide a
starting point for practicing lawyers faced with fourth amendment
issues.
Some opinions defining the meaning and scope of the fourth
amendment are simply the Supreme Court's attempt to apply fourth
amendment law to modern technology never anticipated by the found-
ing fathers.1 More recently, however, a Court opinion defining the
meaning and scope of the fourth amendment often reflects an effort to
provide greater opportunity for law enforcement to "get the job done."
What seems increasingly to be determinative is the reasonableness of
law enforcement activity as measured by (1) the societal importance
of the law enforcement goal and (2) how much that law enforcement
activity intrudes on an asserted privacy interest. As the Court re-
cently put it, "It goes without saying that the Fourth Amendment bars
only unreasonable searches and seizures.... Our cases show that in
determining reasonableness, we have balanced the intrusion on the
individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of le-
gitimate governmental interests."2
The current approach to fourth amendment interpretation forms
the backdrop for evaluating cases and preparing arguments. Consis-
tent with this approach, for example, the absence of a warrant is part
1. A prime example is the Court's effort to apply the language of the amendment-
"particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized'--to electronic surveillance activity. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
2. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
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of a measure of reasonableness but rarely the entire story.3 What
often matters more is how the competing law enforcement and pri-
vacy interests are valued and how careful law enforcement officers
were in doing their job.
The law of search, seizure, and arrest is governed by (1) the direct
language of the fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States; (2) caselaw, by state and federal courts, interpreting the fourth
amendment; (3) occasional statutes, state and federal, that prescribe a
higher standard than that required by the fourth amendment and
caselaw interpreting such statutes; and (4) in some states, the direct
language of a state constitutional provision and state caselaw inter-
preting that provision.
4
With respect to an interpretation of the fourth amendment, the
opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States of course trumps
all other opinions, state and federal. With respect to an interpretation
of a state statute or constitutional provision equivalent to the fourth
amendment, the state supreme court in that state provides the last
word so long as its interpretation grants a defendant more rights than
those afforded by the prevailing interpretation of the federal fourth
amendment. If a state opinion attempts to restrict rights afforded
under the federal fourth amendment, however, then the federal
fourth amendment controls.
II. IN GENERAL
The fourth amendment to the Constitution of the United States
provides that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-
tion, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
The express language of the fourth amendment puts four things
directly at issue: probable cause; particularity in describing items to
be seized or location or objects to be searched; the reasonableness of
the search that was conducted; and (4) the need for a warrant. The
Supreme Court of the United States has also focused in its opinions on
two requirements not addressed expressly by the language of the
fourth amendment: (1) standing to raise a fourth amendment viola-
tion; and (2) the exclusionary rule as remedy. Today the exclusionary
3. See California v. Acevedo, 222 S. Ct. 1982 (1991)(Scalia, J., concurring).
4. Contrast State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975)(under New Jersey Con-
stitution voluntariness of consent search is to be evaluated under waiver stan-
dard) with Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)(under fourth
amendment voluntariness of consent search is to be evaluated under totality of
circumstances test, not under waiver standard).
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rule debate most often surfaces as a Wong Sun5 issue-how far is the
reach of a fourth amendment violation in terms of exclusion of evi-
dence derived from a search or seizure that violates the fourth
amendment.
A. Fourth Amendment Terms Defined
(1) "Seizure": Formally arresting or taking a suspect into custody;
constraining a suspect's freedom of movement (or his freedom to re-
fuse to move) in a significant enough way that it is treated as the
equivalent of an arrest.
6
(2) "Stop": Constraining a suspect's freedom of movement in a
less significant way than a seizure for both a limited period of time and
for a limited purpose.7
(3) "Search": Any intrusion of a protected privacy interest other
than a frisk.8
(4) "Frisk": An intrusion of a protected privacy interest less sig-
nificant than that of a search and whose purpose is to discover weap-
ons, not evidence; a frisk must be conducted in a way that is the least
intrusive possible under the circumstances. 9
(5) "Protective sweep": A quick, limited search of an area con-
fined to a cursory visual inspection of those places in which a person
might ide.1O
(6) "Probable Cause": The degree of evidentiary certainty that
5. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Wong Sun is a rich source for
understanding the law of standing and the meaning of attenuation in deciding
when a primary taint has been sufficiently dissipated to permit introduction of
evidence derived from the primary taint.
6. A "seizure" has two definitions in fourth amendment law- it both is defined as
defined in the text and is the generic term that covers arrests and their
equivalents as well as stops.
The Court last term held that there was no seizure of the person in a situation
in which two officers with badges, one obviously armed, boarded a bus, accosted
the defendant and asked to see his ticket and some identification. According to
the Court, there was no seizure because defendant's confinement was "the natu-
ral result of his decision to take the bus." Florida v. Bostick, 111 S. Ct. 2382
(1991).
7. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). It is neither a seizure nor a stop for a
law enforcement officer to approach an individual in a public place and ask him
questions to which he is willing to listen or for an officer to follow behind or
along the side of an individual and then chase that individual when he begins to
run after seeing the officer. Id; California v. Hodari D., 111 S. Ct. 1547 (1991)(no
seizure where suspect refuses to yield upon show of authority); Michigan v. Ches-
ternut, 486 U.S. 567 (1988).
8. A "search" has two definitions in fourth amendment law: it both is defined as
defined in the text and is the generic term that covers any intrusion of a pro-
tected privacy interest, including a frisk.
9. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
10. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
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permits a law enforcement officer to search or directly to seize. Prob-
able cause means that the known facts and circumstances are such
that a person of "reasonable caution" would feel a fair degree of confi-
dence that he knows what is going on and can take action in re-
sponse.'" "In dealing with probable cause . . . as the very name
implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are
the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which rea-
sonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act."' 2
(7) "Reasonable Suspicion": The degree of evidentiary certainty
that permits a law enforcement officer to stop or frisk or conduct a
protective sweep beyond the scope of a protective sweep justified as a
search incident to arrest. Reasonable suspicion requires a quantum of
objective data, less than that necessary to show probable cause, that is
reflected in specific, articulable reasons advanced by a law enforce-
ment officer to explain his suspicion.13
B. Establishing Probable Cause
1. Using Common Sense
What does it mean to make a common sense, nontechnical decision
about probable cause? Suppose a one-car automobile accident occurs
in the early morning hours of January 1st on a winding, mountain
road. The driver is not talking; the one passenger in the car is dead. It
is a clear night; the officer on the scene sees no skid marks on the
road. A witness to the accident estimates that the car was going at a
speed of at least sixty-five miles an hour. The two people in the car
are dressed in evening clothes. The officer on the scene finds a party
invitation in the purse belonging to the passenger.
Is there probable cause to believe that the driver was driving
drunk? Based on the type accident that occurred, the fact it was New
Year's Eve, the fact driver and passenger were dressed for a party, and
what we know of New Year's Eve parties, the answer likely is yes. In
fact, the answer might be yes even if the officer had not found the
party invitation and there had been no witness to estimate the speed at
which the car was traveling.
In arguing against a determination of probable cause, it is never
sufficient simply to suggest alternative, innocent explanations for
what occurred. Probable cause does not mean that the government's
explanation is the only explanation that covers the facts, that the gov-
ernment's explanation is more likely than not to be the correct expla-
11. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
12. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
13. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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nation,14 or even that the government's is the most likely explanation.
Probable cause means simply that the government has offered a rea-
sonable and plausible explanation of the available data.
An experienced officer who believes that there is probable cause
may well be correct in her belief. The problem that often arises is that
a prosecutor does an inadequate job in assisting the officer to articu-
late the facts on which she relied to form her conclusion.
Return to the New Year's Eve accident, Suppose that the officer
on the scene arrested the driver for driving while intoxicated. Sup-
pose that during a search incident to arrest the officer found a leafy
substance that turned out to be marijuana.
At a pretrial hearing on a motion to suppress the marijuana from
use at trial, the defense argues that the marijuana must be suppressed
because there was no probable cause to arrest the driver. The arrest-
ing officer testifies only that she thought the driver was drunk be-
cause it was a one-car accident and it happened on New Year's Eve.
This testimony would be insufficient to establish probable cause. The
prosecutor's job is to extract the facts as to how the driver and passen-
ger were dressed, the party invitation, the weather conditions, and the
absence of skid marks. These facts, while unmentioned by the officer
in her conclusory statement, were used by the officer in reaching her
conclusion.
With a good, experienced officer, the more facts she relates to sup-
port her conclusion, the more likely that a magistrate will find prob-
able cause. Here facts are a prosecutor's friend. Conversely, with an
inexperienced officer or one with the reputation of making hasty judg-
ments, adducing underlying facts may help the defense show just how
unsupported (or badly reasoned) was the officer's conclusion.
2. It's the Magistrate's Decision
A probable cause determination must be made by a "neutral and
detached magistrate,"' 5 either before the fact in issuing a warrant or
after the fact in permitting the introduction at trial of evidence that
was seized. While the evidence relied on to make a probable cause
determination need not be evidence that would be admissible at
trial,16 the information upon which a magistrate relies may not simply
be conclusory statements made by the affiant (or by the informer).
A magistrate always has two questions to answer in deciding
whether there is probable cause to support a search and seizure. First,
is the person who provided the first-hand information credible and re-
14. A preponderance of the evidence standard requires that a conclusion must be
more likely true than not.
15. Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958).
16. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949); FED. R. CRIm. P. 41(c)(1).
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liable? Second, are the conclusions that the person reached reason-
able under the circumstances?
Suppose that the information provided to a magistrate is that Sam
Suspect was seen running out of a bank in which a robbery had just
occurred and that Sam was carrying a gun and pulling a stocking off
his head as he ran. Those facts, if true, certainly are sufficient to es-
tablish probable cause that Sam robbed the bank. But the question
left unanswered is whether the person who provided the information
was telling the truth.
Now turn the hypothetical around and suppose that the informa-
tion provided the magistrate comes from a person who the magistrate
is convinced is honest and forthright. This time, however, the only
information provided is the simple statement that Sam Suspect robbed
a bank. Now the question left unanswered is whether the person who
supplied the information reached conclusions that were justified by
the factual information underlying his conclusions. To make clear the
problem here, suppose that the person formed his conclusion about
Sam on the sole basis that he saw Sam drive out of the bank's parking
lot at about the time the bank was robbed. No matter how truthful
the person is who provided that information, the information, by it-
self, does not show probable cause that Sam robbed the bank.
These two separate considerations (reliability of informer and rea-
sonableness of conclusion) form the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged
test.17 Under Aguilar-Spinelli each prong had to be satisfied indepen-
dently of the other with sufficient underlying information for an in-
dependent magistrate to make her own conclusions about each. The
rigid requirements of the two-pronged test have been superceded by a
test focused on the totality of the circumstances.1 8 But in deciding
whether the totality of the circumstances shows probable cause, focus-
ing on the two prongs of Aguilar-Spinelli still helps to evaluate the
type and sufficiency of the information provided.
Suppose that a law enforcement officer seeks a search warrant.
The officer is under oath. He also is someone known to the magistrate
as reliable. Today, either fact by itself likely satisfies any concern
about his reliability (prong one)19 in providing information on which
the magistrate will rely in deciding whether to issue the warrant. In
deciding whether sufficient facts are provided to evaluate the officer's
conclusion (prong 2) that a warrant is appropriate, the Supreme Court
directs the magistrate to consider the number and specificity of the
facts provided (whether or not the specificity relates directly to crimi-
nality)20 as well as to rely on the officer's expertise in drawing particu-
17. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).
18. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
19. Id-
20. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
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lar inferences from the facts that he has.2 '
If the officer's conclusion comes not from personal observation but
from information provided by an informer, the magistrate must evalu-
ate the informer's reliability as well as the reasonableness of the con-
clusion that he reached. The informer's reliability may be satisfied by
the informer's past track record with tips or by the officer's recitation
of why he trusts the informer. If the information provided constitutes
a statement against the informer's penal interest, that also helps to
demonstrate informer reliability22
Under the Aguilar-Spinelli two-pronged test a deficiency in in-
former-provided information on one prong could be compensated for
by law enforcement activity that corroborated or bolstered the infor-
mation. For example, if the tip was from an informer unknown even
to the officer, then the officer still could demonstrate reliability
(prong one) by corroborating details provided by the informer. Cor-
roboration also could derive from the fact that the suspect identified
by the informer was one "known to the officer" to deal in drugs.
Under the totality of the circumstances test a deficiency still may
be satisfied by corroboration. What is new is that a deficiency on one
prong also may be satisfied by a "strong showing on the other."23
Under the totality of the circumstances test, evidence on both prongs
is relevant to an overall probable cause determination; a deficiency on
one or the other prong does not per se establish a failure to demon-
strate probable cause.
The probable cause decision, however, remains the responsibility
of the magistrate. She therefore still needs to have enough underlying
information-whatever the nature of the information and on which-
ever prong it belongs-from which she can exercise her own common
sense and make an independent decision as to the existence of prob-
able cause.
C. Necessity of Obtaining a Warrant and What It Means to Say That a
Warrant Must be Obtained
The warrant requirement is separate from the requirement that
there be probable cause. All full searches (ie., not frisks); and all full
seizures (i.e., not stops) must be supported by a probable cause deter-
mination. Except for administrative and other regulatory searches,
discussed infra, to conduct a search or to effect a seizure there must be
probable cause that a crime has been committed and (1) that the per-
son against whom the warrant issued committed the crime (showing
necessary for arrest); or (2) that evidence of the crime may be found
21. Id
22. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 268 (1983)(White, J., concurring).
23. I& at 233.
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at the place to be searched (showing necessary for search); or (3) that
the item to be seized is evidence, an instrumentality, or fruit of a crime
(showing necessary for seizure).2 4
There are situations in which the Supreme Court of the United
States has held that law enforcement activity need never be predi-
cated on a warrant authorizing the activity (public felony arrests, for
example). There are other situations in which the Supreme Court of
the United States has held that law enforcement activity must be
predicated on a warrant (arrests in a private home, for example).
Whenever the law does not require a warrant, then the govern-
ment never is faced with the need to justify why, on the circumstances
of the particular case, no warrant was obtained. The government has
no obligation to justify its conduct because there is no predicate re-
quirement that was breached.
Whenever the law requires that a warrant issue, then either a war-
rant must have issued OR in the particular circumstances an exception
to the warrant requirement must be applicable and must excuse the
absence of a warrant. In other words, to say that a warrant is neces-
sary is not to say that its absence requires suppression of evidence ob-
tained. It is simply to say that the government must justify its
warrantless activity by pointing to an emergency (or other exception
recognized by the Court) that obviates the need to first obtain a
warrant.
When a law enforcement officer acts pursuant to warrant, a magis-
trate at a motion to suppress (or a later appellate court) pays "great
deference" to the probable cause decision embodied in the decision to
issue the warrant.25 By contrast, in the situation in which no warrant
was obtained,26 there has been no determination by a magistrate. At a
motion to suppress, then, the magistrate cannot defer to an antecedent
judicial decision because there is no antecedent judicial decision to
which to defer. As a consequence, the government bears the burden
of persuading the magistrate that there was probable cause for its ac-
tions.27 If a law enforcement officer did something that normally may
be done only on warrant, then the government also bears the burden
24. A fourth amendment seizure may be of intangible items. Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967)(wiretapping); United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324 (2d Cir.
1990)(taking photographs).
25. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102
(1964). See State v. Doile, 244 Kan. 493, 769 P.2d 666 (1989).
26. I here am talking about searches and seizures. A law enforcement officer never
has to act pursuant to warrant for a public felony arrest. She thus never has to
justify a warrantless public felony arrest.
27. In a case in which reasonable suspicion is enough to justify the level of law en-
forcement activity undertaken, then the government bears the burden of per-
suading the magistrate that the law enforcement activity was prompted by a
reasonable suspicion.
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of persuading the magistrate that the circumstances fell within an ex-
ception to the warrant requirement.
1. Arrests2 8
Historically, felony arrests were warrantless.29 In most American
jurisdictions today, there is no warrant requirement either for public
felony arrests or for arrests for misdemeanors committed in the pres-
ence of an arresting officer.30 This means that, while the government
later has to satisfy a magistrate that there was probable cause to jus-
tify the arrest (or any evidence obtained during a search incident to
the arrest will be suppressed), the government need make no showing
of special circumstances to justify the failure to obtain a warrant.
An arrest in a private home, by contrast, must be on warrant. If
the arrest is in a home that the suspect owns or rents (even though the
suspect has a reasonable expectation of privacy), then an arrest war-
rant will be sufficient to enter the home and to search for the suspect.
If the home to be entered belongs to someone other than the suspect
(even though the suspect does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy), then a search warrant is necessary for entry.31
A defendant must have standing-in other words, a sufficient pri-
vacy nexus with a place searched-in order to challenge the introduc-
tion of evidence found as a result of a search. The privacy nexus
necessary for standing to move to suppress evidence found in a home
likely is coextensive with the privacy nexus that permits entry in a
private home on an arrest (rather than a search) warrant. One gen-
eral rule, therefore, is that any time a defendant has standing to chal-
lenge an entry into a private home by definition that is a situation in
which an arrest warrant was sufficient to achieve entry. A second
general rule is that any time a search warrant is constitutionally re-
quired to achieve entry but only an arrest warrant was obtained, then
a defendant will lack standing to challenge the entry qua entra and
may challenge the introduction of only that evidence with which he
has a privacy nexus. He will have standing to challenge the illegal
entry qua entry (as well as any evidence obtained as a direct result of
28. The requirements for obtaining an arrest warrant vary little from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. For federal prosecutions, these requirements are covered in FED. R.
CRIM. P. 4(d)(4) (pre-information or indictment) and 9(c)(2) (on information or
indictment). For a warrant to issue there must be probable cause to believe that a
crime was committed and that the defendant committed it. Probable cause must
be shown on the face of the complaint, affidavit, or information. [Fact of
indictment establishes probable cause.] After arrest the arrested person must be
taken "without unnecessary delay" to the nearest magistrate. FED. R. Cmi. P. 5.
29. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
30. I& at 455 n.21.
31. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
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the illegal entry and suppressible only on that ground) only if the law
enforcement officers had neither an arrest nor a search warrant.
Consider an illustration. Huey, Louie, and Dewey are all fifteen
years old and are drinking beer at Mary's house. This is their first
visit. The police suspect the boys of possession of alcohol; they enter
Mary's house with an arrest warrant for the boys. Mary has standing
to challenge the entry without search warrant as it is her house. By
contrast, Huey, Dewey, and Louie cannot challenge the entry because,
as to them, the police are lawfully there. Thus, a charge of possession
will stick. If, however, the police had no warrant at all, then the boys
have standing to challenge the entry.
2. Search and Seizure3 2
By contrast to felony arrests, for a search or seizure the formal
presumption is that a warrant is necessary. As a formal matter, that
means that the government will succeed on a motion to suppress only
if it either produces a warrant or establishes the existence of an excep-
tion to the warrant requirement. It is useful to phrase the govern-
ment's burden in terms of formal presumptions and formal matters of
proof because some exceptions to the warrant requirement operate au-
tomatically. Foremost among this type of exception are the automo-
bile exception and the exception for a search conducted incident to
arrest. All that the government need establish for an automobile ex-
ception to apply is that the search was of a car.33 Virtually all that the
government need establish for a search incident to arrest warrant ex-
ception to apply is that the suspect was arrested.3 4
D. Particularity in Describing Situs of Search or Items to be Seized
The particularity requirement operates to assist in a probable cause
determination at the outset; it is applicable, of course, both to warrant-
32. For federal prosecutions, the requirements for obtaining a search warrant are
covered in FED. R. CRim. P. 41. Currently, for a warrant to be issued there must
be probable cause to search for and seize a person who may be arrested; or
evidence, fruits, or means of committing a crime; or to search for a person
unlawfully held by another. Normally a warrant application must be
accompanied by an affidavit written and sworn to before a magistrate. [In
specified circumstances a warrant may be obtained by telephone.] A warrant
must be served within 10 days of issuance. If to be served at night, express
authority is needed.
Rule 41 permits anticipatory warrants (obtaining a warrant today to search
tomorrow on probable cause that evidence will be at a certain place tomorrow)
and what I call peripetetic warrants (warrant issued in jurisdiction A may be used
in jurisdiction B on probable cause that the evidence now is in jurisdiction B).
33. For a fuller discussion of the fourth amendment as it applies to automobiles, see
infra notes 67-78.
34. For a discussion of the particular requirements of a search incident to arrest, see
infra notes 50-53.
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less searches or seizures and those on warrant. Normally, however,
the particularity requirement is evaluated in the context of searches
and seizures on warrant as it is this type of law enforcement activity
that precludes any possibility of providing a reason for the law en-
forcement activity that was adjusted after the fact to conform to what
actually was found.
The place or person to be searched must be named or identified
with reasonable particularity either in the warrant application or in
the accompanying affidavit. With some reasonable level of particular-
ity the items constituting the object of the search also must be
stated.35
Where a warrant in terms is overbroad in some but not all respects
(warrant named items A, B, C, D, and "other items") some magis-
trates will sever the two specifications and treat them as separate war-
rants, evaluating each in terms of the particularity requirement. If
treated separately, the first warrant is good as to the named items A,
B, C, D and the second warrant is invalid as overbroad.36 What should
be clear, however, is that an overbroad warrant that names no particu-
lar items or class of items cannot be saved without emasculating the
warrant requirement.
Where a warrant contains tainted information that should not have
been used in making a probable cause determination, a magistrate
likely will evaluate the warrant without regard to the tainted informa-
tion to decide if this other, untainted information is sufficient to up-
hold the probable cause determination. If so, then the warrant is good
notwithstanding the taint.
3 7
A warrant that seems unambiguous when issued but turns out to.
be ambiguous when executed nonetheless may be valid where the of-
ficer's mistake that led to the ambiguity was reasonable under the
circumstances. 38
35. Compare Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976) and Steele v. United States,
267 U.S. 498 (1925) with People v. Prall, 314 Ill. 518, 145 N.E. 610 (1924).
36. See, e.g., People v. Hellemeyer, 28 Ill. App. 3d 491, 328 N.E. 2d 626 (1975). There
now are cases, moreover, in which a warrant lacking in specificity has been saved
by application of the good faith exception. See, e.g., United States v. Buck, 813
F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1987)(warrant permitted search of house and seizure of anything
related to named crime; good faith exception applied to save search).
37. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
38. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1988)(place identified as "third-floor apart-
ment" at particular address where police did not know there were two third-floor
apartments and where apartment searched was not the one police intended to
search when applying for warrant). See also Hamilton v. Mississippi, 556 So.2d
685 (Miss. 1990)(adjacent buildings; warrant authorized search of one when the
other was the building police wanted to, and did, search).
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E. Reasonable Scope of Search
With probable cause, and with or without a warrant, the fourth
amendment also directs that the scope of a search must be reasonable.
In this sense, the particularity requirement operates not only to assist
in a probable cause determination at the outset but it also controls the
permissible scope of a search. A law enforcement officer may not look
in a letter envelope if the object of the search is a stolen television set.
Nor may he check stereo equipment for serial numbers when his ini-
tial purpose in entering and searching is to look for weapons and the
person who used them.39
An officer is entitled to search for a suspect anywhere that he be-
lieves the suspect may be hiding. If the only "item" sought is the sus-
pect, however, then, once the suspect is found and arrested, a full
search of the premises must stop. The Supreme Court recently held
that law enforcement officers are entitled to conduct a protective
sweep of areas of a home or other premises to look for a person other
than the suspect who may hiding on the premises and pose a danger to
law enforcement officers.4 0
F. Place to be Searched
Third-party premises may be searched even though the third party
is not suspected of criminal activity.41 If a person is on the premises
when a warrant is executed-and is not himself designated in the war-
rant-there must be some quantum of cause (or some exception to the
warrant requirement) before that person may be searched.42 On the
other hand, a search warrant carries with it limited authority to hold a
person on the premises while a search is conducted.4
3
III. EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT
A. Good Faith
When a law enforcement officer in good faith relies on a warrant
ultimately found defective then evidence discovered pursuant to that
warrant nonetheless is admissible. 44 Good faith is defined as "an ob-
jectively reasonable basis" for believing in the validity of a warrant.
The outer boundaries of the good faith exception are clear. At one
extreme, in which the good faith exception always applies, is a situa-
tion in which there is a technical problem with the authorizing war-
39. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
40. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990). For a discussion of this case, see infra
sections IIL.B and III.H.
41. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
42. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979)(patrons in bar).
43. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
44. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
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rant as, for example, when the authorizing warrant is defective
because the wrong warrant form is used.45 At the other extreme, in
which the good faith exception never applies, is a situation in which
there was deceit in obtaining the warrant. Between the extremes sit
the hard cases.46 While the good faith exception applies when the au-
thorizing warrant is defective due to an erroneous probable cause deci-
sion by a magistrate on facts that present a close call as to the
existence of probable cause,47 the exception does not apply to save a
probable cause determination when there clearly was insufficient in-
formation on which a magistrate could decide that there was probable
cause (what is called a "barebones" affidavit).48
The reason given by the Court for the good faith exception is that it
encourages law enforcement officers to apply for warrants since they
need not fear an overtechnical after-the-fact review of the magistrate's
probable cause decision. This clear preference for warrants strongly
suggests that the good faith exception will not be applied by the Court
generally in warrantless search situations but will continue to be ap-
plied only to searches made on warrant or near equivalent--as, for
example, when a law enforcement officer relies on specific statutory
authorization to proceed without warrant where that statute later is
held unconstitutional.49
The fact that the good faith exception applies to warrants and their
near equivalents means that there is a two-step process involved in
evaluating the merits of a good faith claim. The first step is to see if in
fact the search was on warrant or near equivalent. If not, then the
government's good faith claim should fail without regard to whether
the law enforcement officers acted in an objectively reasonable man-
ner. If there was a warrant or near equivalent, then and only then
45. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
46. The Sixth Circuit recently considered a novel situation under the good faith ex-
ception. United States v. Bowling, 900 F.2d 926 (6th Cir. 1990). Officers obtained
a search warrant but, before executing it, they acquired information that called
into question the magistrate's probable cause decision. This information resulted
from a search conducted on consent that yielded no evidence. Therefore the in-
formation the officers had was that nothing might be found during their search.
In these circumstances, according to the court, the officers should return to the
magistrate for a new probable cause determination. Failure to do so possibly may
not constitute good faith. (On the facts, although the officers did not so return,
the search was upheld since the court decided a magistrate still would have found
probable cause.)
47. Id.
48. An illustration of a "barebones" affidavit may be found in United States v. Bar-
rington, 806 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1986)(no good faith exception). The only informa-
tion provided to the magistrate to support the officer affiant's belief that he
would find the named item in the named place was the officer's statement that he
received information from an informant who in the past had provided informa-
tion that led to arrests and convictions. Id at 530.
49. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
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should the second step be reached. That step is to evaluate the objec-
tive reasonableness of what the officers did.
B. Search Incident to Arrest
Since Chimel v. California5o was decided more than twenty years
ago, the law has been clear that on any arrest, and for no additional
reason stated, an officer may search the person and effects of a person
under arrest and whatever is in the immediate reach of that person.
The search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement
permitted a full search of places and items within "armsreach" of the
suspect in which evidence or weapons might be discovered.5 1 The
search incident to arrest warrant exception also permitted such a
search before or after formal arrest so long as the search was reason-
ably proximate to the time and place of the arrest.52
The law regarding the appropriate scope of a search incident to
arrest is expanded to permit a protective sweep in areas in which a
search incident to arrest would have been unjustified under Chimel.53
Law enforcement officers conducting a protective sweep as a search
incident to arrest may go beyond armsreach to look in closets and
other spaces immediately adjacent to the place of arrest that are large
enough to hide a person. As the Court describes a protective sweep, it
is not a full search but is a visual inspection of an area in which a
person dangerous to the police might be hiding (the visual inspection,
however, allows the police to open a closet door, for example). A
search-incident-to-arrest protective sweep may be conducted automat-
ically on an arrest in the same way that the Chimel search incident to
arrest is allowed on no additional cause beyond the fact of the arrest.
C. Consent
A person may consent to a search that would otherwise be invalid
either for lack of a warrant or for lack of probable cause to search.5 4
He need not be told that he has the right to refuse a search.55 Consent
is not involuntary simply because consent comes after arrest.5 6 As
50. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
51. If the arrest was of someone in an automobile, then the search incident to arrest
exception permitted a search of the passenger compartment of the car, including
glove compartment, and any items, closed or open, found in the passenger com-
partment. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
52. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977). See also Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364 (1964).
53. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
54. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). See Florida v. Jimeno, 111 S. Ct.
1801 (1991)(consent to search car for drugs encompassed consent to search paper
bag found in car).
55. 1&
56. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
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with other exceptions to the warrant requirement, it is the govern-
ment's burden to show that in the circumstances a consent was
voluntary.57
Certainly a law enforcement officer may act on the consent of a
person who has a significant relationship to the premises5 -- at least if
no one objects who is present at the time of the search and has equal
or greater authority over the premises. 59 In deciding whether the per-
son who consented actually had the authority to consent, law enforce-
ment officers reasonably may rely on the apparent authority of a third
person.60
D. Plain View
When a law enforcement officer otherwise legitimately is on the
premises, then, without the necessity of first obtaining a warrant, he
may seize an item in plain view if the item, itself or together with
other information that the officer has, sings out its criminality. In
other words, an item that is in plain view may be seized if the officer
who sees it has probable cause to believe that the item is contraband
or evidence of a crime.61 If the item in plain view, itself or together
with other information that the officer has, gives the officer a reason-
able suspicion that the item is contraband or evidence of a crime then
he may hold the item in place for a reasonable period of time that
permits him to investigate further.62 So long as the item is in plain
view and the police legitimately are present, then it does not matter
that before arriving on the premises the police had reason to believe
the item would be found there (put in the language of the case, the
discovery of the item in plain view need not be inadvertent).63
Except for a limited exception regarding automobiles, the plain
view exception never supports a search because if it is necessary to
search to find the item or to verify that it is suspicious in character,
57. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
58. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)(state's burden to show common
authority).
59. Some courts have held, or at least suggested, that, even with a significant rela-
tionship to the premises, a third party may not consent to a search if the suspect
is present and refuses consent. See, e.g., State v. Leach, 113 Wash. 2d 735,782 P.2d
1035 (1989)(consent to search invalid if objected to by person on premises with
equal authority to consent); Ledda v. State, 564 A.2d 1125 (1989)(driver's consent
to search valid where owner present and did not object); People v. Veiga, 214 Cal.
App. 3d 817, 262 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1989)(consent to search given by tenant not pres-
ent valid at least when those on scene do not object); United States v. Elrod, 441
F.2d 353 (5th Cir. 1971).
60. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 110 S. Ct. 832 (1990).
61. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
62. Id.; See aZso United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985).
63. Horton v. California, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990).
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then, by definition, the item is not in plain view.64 Note that if an
officer properly may search in a particular place for item A and in so
doing finds item B, then item B is in plain view at that point even
though it was not earlier in plain view and even though the officer had
no cause to search for item B.
When an officer is not already on the premises but instead is legiti-
mately in a place from which she observes something in plain view,
and her observations do not invade a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy, then she may use her observations to establish probable cause to
enter the premises.65 Subsequent entry or seizure requires a warrant
only if it is a non-exigent situation and the warrant requirement ap-
plies to the particular premises to be entered or the item to be taken.6 6
E. Automobiles
The Supreme Court has engrafted an automobile exception onto
the operation of the fourth amendment broader than all other excep-
tions. The Court has advanced several reasons to explain its different
treatment of automobiles: (1) automobile use historically and cur-
rently is regulated in a way that use of a private home is not and could
not be regulated; (2) a person does not have the same expectation of
privacy in an automobile that he has in a private home; and
(3) automobiles are always an exigent circumstance because theoreti-
cally they always are mobile (even when factually they are not).
Whatever the reason for the automobile exception, one thing is clear:
statements of fourth amendment law sitting in cases involving
automobiles do not transfer automatically to fourth amendment cases
not involving automobiles.
A brief recitation of the law involving automobiles is as follows:
1. On a Terry stop and frisk theory, where reasonable suspicion is
enough to justify law enforcement action, the automobile exception
permits a search anywhere in the passenger compartment of a car in
which a weapon might be hidden.67 Although the purpose of the
search, as with all Terry searches, is to locate weapons, the search is
not dependent on a factual demonstration that the suspect could have
reached a weapon.68
64. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987).
65. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989)(aerial surveillance of greenhouse in private
yard from 400 feet); Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986)(aerial
surveillance of industrial property from 1200 feet); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207 (1986)(aerial surveillance of private yard from 1000 feet).
66. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109
(1984).
67. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
68. I& (search permitted of entire passenger compartment of car even though sus-
pect out of car and unable to reach in).
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2. On a Terry stop and frisk theory, where reasonable suspicion is
enough to justify law enforcement action, the automobile exception
permits a stop of an automobile for a reasonable time (twenty minutes
for a license check is presumptively reasonable) 69 to investigate and
quell the suspicion.
3. On a search incident to arrest theory, the automobile exception
permits a search of the entire passenger compartment of a car, includ-
ing closed containers.70
4. On a theory of probable cause to search a car, the automobile
exception permits a search of the entire car and anything in it that
could contain the items being searched for71 at any time up to at least
eight hours after seizure of the car.72
5. On a theory of probable cause to search and seize a particular
item (and probable cause to believe that the item is in the car), the
automobile exception permits a search of the car to find the item as
well as a search and seizure of the item once it is found.73
6. On a theory of probable cause to search and seize a particular
item (and probable cause to believe that the item is in the car), the
automobile exception permits a search for that item up to at least
three days after seizure of the car.74
7. On a theory of inventory search, the automobile exception per-
mits a search of an automobile found on the street and towed because
of overdue parking tickets7 5 as well as a search of closed containers
found within the car.76 The theory of inventory search, moreover, in-
cludes a search of a car towed after the suspect's arrest.
77
69. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985) (determination if material was mari-
juana). The Supreme Court recently denied a petition for a writ of certiorari in a
case in which the Virginia Court of Appeals upheld a motor vehicle stop.
Limonja v. Virginia, 8 Va. App. 532, 383 S.E.2d 476 (1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct.
1925 (1990). In Linmona, the driver ran a stop sign at a toll booth. The driver first
consented to a search of the car but later withdrew her consent. After consent
was withdrawn, there was a 22-minute wait for a drug-sniffing dog to arrive at the
scene to check the contents of the package. The Virginia Court of Appeals de-
cided that the delay was not overlong, given that the officers knew (1) the car
was rented in Florida and was driven along a drug trafficker route; (2) defend-
ants car was equipped with a radar device illegal in the state; (3) defendant lied
as to why she ran the stop sign; (4) the car's passenger was nervous when the
package was found in the car, and (5) the passenger gave a confused explanation
for errors in the address on the package.
70. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981).
71. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982); California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)
(mobile home).
72. Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380 (1984).
73. California v. Acevedo, 111 S. Ct. 1982 (1991).
74. United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985).
75. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
76. Id
77. Colorado v. Bertine, 379 U.S. 367 (1987).
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8. On a theory of plain view, the automobile exception permits
reaching into an automobile and moving papers in order to read a Ve-
hicle Identification Number (VIN).78
F. Emergency Situations
1. Hot Pursuit
A law enforcement officer may make a warrantless entry of a pri-
vate home when in hot pursuit of a suspect whom he has probable
cause to arrest or search. Thereafter, the officer may search any-
where in the home that the suspect may have hidden himself (or
where he may have hidden something incriminating that the officer
has probable cause to believe is present).79 Pursuit need not be all
that hot nor need the officer personally have witnessed the crime and
begun a pursuit at that point.8 0 The crime committed by the suspect,
however, must be more than a nonjailable traffic offense to justify a
nighttime warrantless entry.81
2. Imminent Threat to Safety
Obviously law enforcement officers may enter premises if they
have probable cause to believe that there is a danger to inhabitants or
that a (serious) crime is in progress. Similarly, fire inspectors may
search without warrant on prompt reentry after a fire to prevent its
recurrence.8 2 Safety concerns are legitimate, however, only when
there is reason to believe that the danger is immediately present.
They may not be used as a subterfuge to gain, retain, or regain entry.
For example, the fact of a fire does not justify warrantless reentry to
search for evidence of a crime once the danger of fire has passed.
8 3
Nor does the fact that a homicide occurred in a home, even if just an
hour earlier, justify a warrantless search for evidence.8 4
3. Destruction of Evidence
A law enforcement officer may make a warrantless search or
seizure when a delay to obtain a warrant might mean destruction of
evidence.8 5 For this exception to apply, however, the officer must
have probable cause to believe that the evidence is in the place to be
78. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986).
79. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
80. See id.
81. Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984)(drunk driving).
82. Compare Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) with Michigan v. Clifford, 464
U.S. 287 (1984).
83. IAd
84. Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17 (1984).
85. Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973)(fingernail scrapings); Schmerber v. Califor-
nia, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)(blood sample).
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searched. He likely also must have probable cause to believe that de-
struction of evidence will result if he delays and his investigative
needs (as reason for why he did not apply earlier for the warrant)
must be legitimate and not a subterfuge.
G. Administrative and Other Regulatory Searches
Historically, administrative searches were those searches whose
main purpose related to legitimate health, safety, and police power
regulatory interests, not law enforcement interests. In theory, when-
ever the main purpose of a search is to investigate a particular crime
thought to be committed by a particular individual, then an adminis-
trative search rationale will not support the search. In practice, par-
ticularly in the past ten years, the line separating health/safety/
regulatory and criminal investigations has blurred.8 6
Administrative searches may be conducted without probable cause
directed at a particular individual or premises and frequently may be
conducted without a warrant.87 The probable cause determination
that supports an administrative search is best explained as one based
on a statistical probablility that in a given class of searches a number
of violations will be uncovered.
Some searches, even when conducted by law enforcement officers
specifically to search for evidence of crime, are treated as equivalent to
an administrative search. They are upheld routinely when procedures
are set forth in writing and in advance of law enforcement activity and
the Court perceives a significant law enforcement or societal interest.
Today, drug testing is a prime example of a significant societal inter-
est-so significant that testing is permitted even in the face of signifi-
cant privacy intrusions and on evidence that the statistical probability
of finding something is quite low, even miniscule.
The cases dealing with administrative searches are not entirely in
harmony. Several factors support an administrative search rationale
86. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 488 (1978)(fire inspectors checking for arson sev-
eral days after fire need administrative warrant once "reasonable time" has
passed and they need traditional search warrant once there is probable cause to
believe fire caused by arson).
87. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987)(warrantless search pursuant to statute of
heavily regulated industry-junkyards-upheld even though regulatory search
was directed at finding stolen property and thus had goal identical to jurisdic-
tion's criminal statutes); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981)(warrantless
search pursuant to federal statute of heavily regulated industry-mines-up-
held); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978)(area warrant necessary for
search of workplace pursuant to federal statute); United States v. Biswell, 406
U.S. 311 (1972)(warrantless search pursuant to federal statute of heavily regu-
lated industry-gun dealers-upheld); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967)
(area warrant necessary for search of parts of commercial warehouse closed to
public); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967)(area warrant necessary
for search of apartment building by Housing Inspector).
1991]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
for conducting a search (they are the same factors that support con-
ducting an administrative search without warrant): an industry that is
heavily regulated; a specific statutory scheme and specific procedures
adopted to govern conduct and timing of searches; a pressing public
interest in having such searches; an insubstantial intrusion on a pri-
vacy interest--or a substantial intrusion on what the Court considers
an insubstantial privacy interest; and the absence, or dearth, of alter-
natives for effecting the regulatory scheme.
Several administrative searches are of particular relevance to law
enforcement.
1. Inventory searches when conducted according to established
procedures articulated in advance.88
In the context of a search of an impounded automobile, the Court
recently decided that established procedures may leave some discre-
tion to the officer doing an inventory search to evaluate the particular
circumstances in deciding on the extent of the search that is neces-
sary.8 9 What this means is that, while inventory search procedures
need to provide guidelines for when and how searches will be con-
ducted, the guidelines need not state all-or-nothing rules regarding
the type and extent of a search that is conducted. Instead, the guide-
lines may allow the officer on the scene some discretion to decide the
type action necessary under the circumstances.
Suppose a written guideline governs procedures to be followed
with regard to treatment of locked containers in a car impounded af-
ter the arrest of its driver. The guideline need say neither that locked
containers always must be opened nor that locked containers never
may be opened. Instead, the guideline might direct the officer to eval-
uate the following factors in deciding whether to open a locked
container: (1) the seriousness of the crime for which the suspect was
arrested; (2) the conduct of the suspect at the scene; (3) the possibil-
ity that the container might have valuables (a fancy suitcase, for ex-
ample) or perishables in it; (4) the possibility that the officer would be
subject to a damage claim (as, for example, if the container appears
damaged or the car was involved in an accident); and (5) the officer's
ability to ascertain the contents of a container from its exterior.
2. Automobile stops when conducted according to clear policy
governing the frequency and duration of the stop activity and stated
rules governing selection of the automobiles to be stopped.9 0
The Supreme Court recently upheld the constitutionality of a so-
briety checkpoint system even though, on the particular facts, the ben-
efit to law enforcement seemed negligible.91 During the time that the
88. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
89. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 1632 (1990).
90. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
91. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
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police operated the checkpoint, 126 cars were stopped (entailing an
average delay of twenty-five seconds per car); two drivers were re-
quired to take a sobriety test; one of these was arrested for drunk driv-
ing; and one driver was arrested after attempting to run the
checkpoint.
3. Searches and detentions at United States' borders and their
functional equivalents. 92
The Court has held that the fourth amendment does not apply to
restrain the outside-United States activity of law enforcement officers,
at least when the suspect is a foreign national.
4. Searches of prisoners, probationers, and parolees.93
5. Drug testing of employees at least in some sensitive govern-
ment and industry jobs.94
Because the drug problem is perceived to be pervasive and serious,
it is a fair prediction that the Court that will uphold more and more
drug testing situations on an administrative search rationale.
H. Stops, Frisks and Protected Sweeps95
The law of stop and frisk began with Terry v. Ohio 96 but has
evolved well past the Terry facts. Today, stop and frisk law includes
the opportunity to conduct a protective sweep beyond the scope of a
protective sweep justified as a search incident to arrest.
A stop, frisk, or protective sweep may be undertaken when a law
enforcement officer has a reasonable suspicion, for which he has spe-
cific, articulable reasons, that a crime has been committed97 and:
(1) either that a particular individual committed it or that evi-
dence or fruit of a crime may be found in a particular item or on a
particular individual (showing necessary for stop); or
(2) that a dangerous person is hiding nearby who threatens the
safety of an officer (showing necessary for protective sweep); or
92. See also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); United
States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976).
93. See also United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985); United
States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977); United States v. Martinz-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543 (1976); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
94. In two cases two years ago the Court upheld drug testing justified on an adminis-
trative search rationale. One case involved a Customs Service requirement of
drug testing as a precondition for employment in jobs involving drugs, firearms,
or classified material. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S.
Ct. 1384 (1989)(5-4 vote). The other case involved a federal statute mandating
drug testing of railroad employees after major accidents. Skinner v. Railway La-
bor Executives Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402 (1989)(7-2 vote).
95. See infra Part IV, for a full discussion of the law of stop and frisk.
96. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
97. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985).
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(3) that the suspect has a weapon (showing necessary for frisk).
The specific, articulable reasons articulated by the officer who
makes the stop, frisk, or protective sweep98 may be based on her per-
sonal observations on facts developed by her, on factors derived from
an offender profile that sets forth characteristics normally shared by
offenders committing a particular type crime,99 or even on informa-
tion provided by an anonymous informer.10o In virtually all cases in-
volving an anonymous tip, reasonable suspicion will be present only if
law enforcement officers corroborate some of the information pro-
vided by the informer as otherwise there will be no evidence of the
informer's credibility and reliability. According to the Court, the most
powerful information that can be provided by such an anonymous in-
former is information that predicts what a suspect's future actions will
be.lO'
A stop may be for a period of time reasonable in the circumstances
to investigate and attempt to substantiate or dispel a reasonable
suspicion.102
A frisk (other than perhaps for fingerprints taken at the place of
the stop103 ) is permitted only to search for weapons and includes the
person of the suspect and anything in her armsreach where a weapon
might be.'04 A frisk of the person requires a preliminary pat-down
unless the circumstances make it dangerous for the officer to begin
98. 1d_; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
99. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989).
100. Alabama v. White, 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990). The facts provided by the anonymous
informer were that (1) a woman (2) named White (3) would leave a named
apartment (4) at a named time (time informer stated was not in record; Court
assumed on facts that the time named was immediately after call), (5) would
drive away in (6) a brown Plymouth station wagon with a broken right taillight
lens, (7) proceed to a named motel, and (8) deliver one ounce of cocaine (9) in a
brown attache case.
The police went to the apartment building and saw the Plymouth, as de-
scribed, parked outside. They also saw a woman (name unknown) leave the
building (apartment unknown) and drive away in the Plymouth, taking the most
direct route (a route involving several turns) to the named motel. The police
stopped the car before it arrived at the hotel and obtained consent to search the
car. They found marijuana in an unlocked brown attache case. They found co-
caine in the woman's purse.
The Supreme Court described White as a close case for establishing reason-
able suspicion. It nonetheless concluded that there was sufficient corroboration.
101. Id
102. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985)(in circumstances 20-minute detention
of car was justified); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)(in circumstances
90-minute detention of luggage was too long).
103. The Court recently suggested the possibility that fingerprinting of a suspect, if
done without transporting him somewhere else, might be a permissible frisk if
supported by reasonable suspicion. Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811 (1985).
104. Where automobiles are concerned, an armsreach search includes the passenger
compartment of the car. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983)(search permitted
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with a pat-down. 05
A protective sweep is a cursory visual inspection. When justified
on Terry stop and frisk theory, the sweep must be to protect the safety
of law enforcement officers or others and confined to places in which a
person might be hiding who poses a threat to officers on the prem-
ises.106 If, in conducting a protective sweep, law enforcement officers
find it necessary to open a door or lift a blanket, etc., in order to
achieve a visual inspection of a hiding place, such limited touching be-
yond the visual is permissible. A protective sweep must end once the
suspect is under arrest and law enforcement officers and suspect are
off the premises.
IV. REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
A search and seizure violates the fourth amendment only when the
government invades a protected fourth amendment interest. The old
law of search and seizure defined a protected interest in terms of the
law of property and trespass. Today a protected interest is defined in
terms of a reasonable expectation of privacy.107 The reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy test requires as preconditions that (1) the defend-
ant have an expectation of privacy; and (2) factually it might be said
that the particular circumstances or the particular actions taken by
the defendant made that expectation reasonable;10s and (3) a defend-
ant's expectation of privacy is one that the law (the Court) deems it
reasonable to protect.109
V. STANDING
Perhaps the least understood aspect of fourth amendment law
(and, more generally, the law of the exclusionary rule as remedy)10 is
of entire passenger compartment of car even though suspect out of car and unable
to reach in).
105. I&; Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
106. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
107. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91
(1990) (status as overnight guest in someone's home sufficient to create reasonable
expectation of privacy in premises).
108. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
109. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)(no protectible privacy interest in
garbage left on curb in front of house); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986)(no
protectible privacy interest in VIN even if papers placed over it have to be re-
moved in order to read it); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984)(no pro-
tectible privacy interest in open field even if (1) field not viewable from public
road, and (2) field inside locked gate, and (3) to get to field officers ignore "no
trespass" sign and commit common law trespass); United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109 (1984)(no protectible privacy interest in package shipped by private car-
rier when damage to package reveals white powder and search involves chemical
test of powder).
110. And, even more generally, the law of federal court jurisdiction.
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the requirement that a person must have standing to raise a fourth
amendment violation. Put another way, the law of the exclusionary
rule as remedy requires that a reasonable expectation of privacy be
one that is personal to the defendant. Standing doctrine means that a
"stranger" to a fourth amendment violation cannot succeed in sup-
pressing evidence on the basis of that violation. The mere fact that
evidence derived from illegal law enforcement activity is to be intro-
duced into evidence against a defendant does not give that defendant
standing to challenge its admission on the ground that it invaded his
protected fourth amendment interest. Nor does a defendant achieve
standing merely by demonstrating that somebody had a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in the item seized or the place searched.
To establish standing, a defendant must demonstrate two things:
1. That a protected privacy interest was invaded by law enforce-
ment officers; and
2. That the invaded protected privacy interest was a privacy inter-
est personal to the defendant.111
If a defendant cannot establish that he has standing to raise a
fourth amendment claim then-as to that defendant-there also
never can be a fruit of the poisoned tree problem running from the
initial illegality. That means, of course, that all items derived from
the illegal official activity are admissible against that defendant.
To illustrate standing principles consider the following two
hypotheticals.
HYPOTHETICAL 1
CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM LAW ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY REGARDING
FIRST SUSPECT FOLLOWED BY CONSTITUTIONALLY CORRECT LAW EN-
FORCEMENT ACTIVITY REGARDING OTHER SUSPECTS
Assume Officer Experience makes an illegal arrest of Sam Suspect
(the defect in the arrest is that Officer Experience lacked probable
cause) and then questions him without reading him Miranda warn-
ings. Sam's personal fourth amendment right clearly has been in-
vaded by the illegal arrest (so too his fifth amendment privilege
against self incrimination was offended by the illegal questioning).
Sam now tells Officer Experience that two people-John and Jim
Jackson-are involved in drug dealing and that he has supplied drugs
to them. He describes the mobile home out of which the Jacksons deal
drugs and tells Officer Experience that he has purchased drugs there.
Officer Experience goes to the mobile home (out of uniform of
course) and makes a buy. He then arrests both John and Jim. He
111. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)(occupant of car neither owner nor driver has
no standing to challenge items found in car where occupant makes no claim of
ownership in the item). See generally Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963).
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reads them their Miranda rights. They talk to him, identify the drugs
as supplied by Sam, and implicate themselves and Sam in two
robberies.
As to Sam, all the evidence obtained at the Jackson home-Sam's
involvement in drugs and his involvement in the robberies-may turn
out to be inadmissible as it was the initial invasion of his personal con-
stitutional rights that led to all this later evidence.112 As to John and
Jim, by contrast, all the evidence is admissible as no personal right of
theirs was offended. In other words, as to John and Jim, the poisoned
tree is growing in somebody else's backyard.
HYPOTHETHICAL 2
CONSTITUTIONALLY CORRECT LAw ENFORCEMENT ACT=TY REGARD-
ING FIRST SUSPECT FOLLOWED BY CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM LAW EN-
FORCEMENT ACTIV=rY REGARDING OTHER SUSPECTS
Assume that Officer Experience makes a legal arrest of Sam Sus-
pect, gives him his Miranda rights, and then questions him. This time
there has been no invasion of any of Sam's protected constitutional
rights. Sam again tells Officer Experience that John and Jim Jackson
are involved in drug dealing and that he has supplied drugs to them.
He also gives Officer Experience the address of the mobile home
where the Jacksons live.
Officer Experience goes to the mobile home and, without a war-
rant, forces his way in and conducts a search. He finds drugs. He then
arrests both John and Jim and questions them without first reading
them their Miranda rights. They talk to him, identify the drugs as
supplied by Sam, and implicate themselves and Sam in two robberies.
As to John and Jim, all the evidence is inadmissible (except for any-
thing that Sam may testify to at their trial) because the evidence re-
sulted from an unconstitutional search and an unconstitutional
questioning.
As to Sam, by contrast, all the evidence provided by the Jacksons is
admissible. This is true even if Sam can demonstrate that without his
information Officer Experience never would have found the Jacksons.
Sam has standing to suppress neither the drugs found at the Jackson
home nor the statements made by them because there was no law en-
forcement illegality that led Sam to hand over the Jacksons. Even
though John and Jim have had their rights invaded-and can move to
suppress the drugs and their statements-Sam cannot successfully
move to suppress the evidence because the constitutional invasion of
the Jacksons' rights was not a constitutional invasion of any of Sam's
112. The question as to Sam will be whether any of the evidence is sufficiently attenu-
ated from the primary taint to be admissible notwithstanding the constitutional
violation. See infra.
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rights.113 In other words, as to Sam, the poisoned tree is not in his
own backyard even though he provided the map that located the tree.
VI. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The exclusionary rule operates to exclude from consideration at a
particular defendant's criminal trial any evidence obtained in violation
of that defendant's personal reasonable expectation of privacy pro-
tected by the fourth amendment. A motion to suppress evidence nor-
mally must be made before trial.114 Failure to move pretrial normally
is a waiver that may be excused only on good cause shown. 1 5
The exclusionary rule applies only when (1) the allegedly tainted
evidence is sought to be introduced at the defendant's criminal trial;16
(2) the law (Court) recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the person, place, or item searched or in the person or item seized; and
(3) the defendant has a personal privacy interest giving him standing.
Even when all these factors are present, there are several situations in
which the exclusionary rule still will not apply.
A. Hearings Related to the Criminal Trial
Evidence that is obtained in violation of a particular person's
fourth amendment protected privacy interest nonetheless may be ad-
mitted against him at grand jury proceedings and at sentencing
hearings.117
B. Impeachment of the Defendant
Evidence that is obtained in violation of a particular defendant's
fourth amendment protected privacy interest nonetheless may be
used to impeach his in-court testimony.1 8 The impeachment use of
the evidence permits asking any question that is "reasonably sug-
gested" by the defendant's testimony on direct examination.11 9 This
likely means that a question or line of questions will be permitted any
time it fits under rules otherwise applicable to decide the scope of per-
missible cross-examination.
113. Of course, the statements made by the Jacksons are inadmissible at Sam's trial
since their introduction violates Sam's sixth amendment right of confrontation.
114. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.
115. See id
116. Deportation hearings are an example of a hearing in which the exclusionary rule
is inapplicable. I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984).
117. Evidence obtained in violation of a particular's person's fourth amendment pro-
tected privacy interest probably also is admissible at parole and probation revoca-
tion hearings. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
118. Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62 (1954). See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714
(1975)(Miranda statement).
119. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
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The Court recently made clear that the government may not im-
peach defense witnesses other than the defendant by the use of a de-
fendant's statement made by him after an arrest lacking in probable
cause.12 0 In James v. 1l7inois,121 the defendant's statement was ex-
cluded from the government's case-in-chief as fruit of the poisoned
tree but, had the defendant testified, could have been used to impeach
his in-court testimony. What the government did, and the Supreme
Court rejected, was to use the statement to impeach the credibility of
one of the other defense witnesses. There is language in the opinion
that would limit impeachment use of any illegally seized evidence-
not just defendant statements-to the defendant.
C. Independent Source; Inevitable Discovery
Evidence that is obtained in violation of a particular defendant's
fourth amendment protected privacy interest nonetheless may be
used as direct evidence against him at his criminal trial if the govern-
ment can show' 22 that the evidence had a source independent of the
taint 12s or inevitably would have been discovered anyway.'
2 4
The poisoned tree and evidence derived therefrom constitute one
line from the defendant to the evidence. Because of the poisoned tree,
this line requires suppression. Independent source means that there is
a separate, untainted line that runs from the defendant to the evi-
dence. Inevitable discovery means that, had not the illegality inter-
vened, there would have been a separate, untainted line running from
the defendant to the evidence. The rationale for the independent
source/inevitable discovery exceptions is that the introduction of the
evidence has nothing to do with any law enforcement illegality as the
evidence is not the product of any illegality.
To visualize the operation of the inevitable discovery exception,
consider, as an example, a situation in which Officer Experience sees
Sam Suspect driving in a car with the left rear light out. 25 Officer
Experience stops Sam to give him a ticket (in Officer Experience's
state this type traffic infraction is handled by citation, never by
arrest). Officer Experience smells liquor on Sam's breath, suspects
that Sam has been driving while under the influence of alcohol, and
requests that Sam perform a series of sobriety tests. Sam fails the
tests.
120. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
121. Id
122. Id
123. Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (1988); Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796
(1984); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
124. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
125. For the facts, more or less, on which the hypothetical in the body of the text was
based, see State v. Waddell, 14 Kan. App. 2d 129, 784 P.2d 381 (1989).
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Officer Experience then radioes for a roving breathalyzer van so
that he may give Sam a breathalyzer test. He also conducts a quick
search of Sam's person and the interior of Sam's car.
On Sam's person Officer Experience finds a list of names and ad-
dresses with what appears to be information as to the amount of co-
caine to be delivered to each. In the car Officer Experience finds two
sawed-off shotguns (possession of sawed-off shotguns is illegal in this
state), drug paraphernalia, a box of glassine envelopes, and a suitcase
full of a white powdery substance. Officer Experience field tests the
powder and concludes that it is cocaine. All this takes approximately
ten minutes. At this point the breathalyzer van arrives. Sam takes
the breathalyzer test and is shown to have a blood alcohol level of .154.
He then is placed under arrest.
Sam moves to suppress all the evidence found in the search of him
and his car. At the suppression hearing Officer Experience testifies
that he was not in fear of Sam nor had he any reason to suspect that
Sam carried weapons or was dangerous. The magistrate makes three
findings: (1) when Officer Experience searched Sam and the car he
had no probable cause for the search; (2) since Officer Experience did
not suspect the existence of a weapon, his search could not be upheld
as a Terry frisk; and (3) since no arrest was made the search could not
be upheld as a search incident to arrest. The consequence of these
three findings is that all the evidence requires suppression.
EXCEPT ....
Now consider the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusion-
ary rule. To evaluate the application of the inevitable discovery excep-
tion, what is required is to trace what would have happened had there
been no illegality.
On the facts as detailed above, the breathalyzer van arrived within
minutes after Officer Experience searched Sam and the interior of the
car. Suppose that once Sam failed the sobriety test Officer Experience
conducted no search but instead waited for the arrival of the van. Sup-
pose, moreover, that the routine procedure in Officer Experience's
state-or the routine procedure of Officer Experience-is that a driver
is arrested if he fails a breathalyzer test. What that means is that once
Officer Experience had the results of Sam's breathalyzer test, he
would have arrested Sam. At that point he lawfully could have
searched Sam and the car's interior as a search incident to arrest. He
lawfully would have found the drugs, guns, and list, and he lawfully
would have developed probable cause to search the car's trunk.
All this would have happened without regard to the illegality of
the actions Officer Experience actually took. On the theory of inevita-
ble discovery, therefore, there is a fair chance that all the evidence
will be admissible in Sam's criminal trial.
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VII. FRUIT OF THE POISONED TREE
A violation of a fourth amendment protected privacy interest oper-
ates to exclude evidence that is the direct product of the violation and
evidence derived from the primary violation up to the point at which
later evidence is found to be "sufficiently attenuated" from the pri-
mary taint.126 In other words, if the tree (initial illegality constituting
primary taint) is poisoned, so too may be at least some of its fruit
(evidence).
One precondition to success in excluding evidence from trial as
fruit of the poisoned tree is that the defendant making the motion to
suppress must have standing running from the poisoned tree.12 7 If the
poisoned tree is not in A's backyard, then the tree is admissible against
A and so too any of its fruit.
For a defendant with standing the major question regarding sup-
pression of poisoned fruit is how much, if any, of the fruit was cor-
rupted by the poisoned tree. To answer this, four considerations are
relevant: (1) the degree to which the tree was poisoned [in other
words, the seriousness of the single fourth amendment violation or the
number of fourth, fifth, and sixth amendment violations that were
committed]; 128 (2) the distance in time and place between the fruit
and the poisoned tree; (3) the type fruit involved;129 and (4) the fac-
tors that intervened to dissipate the taint produced by the poisoned
tree. 3 0 The more poisoned the tree the farther along the line one has
to go and the more intervening factors will be necessary before one
reaches evidence that is "sufficiently attenuated."lsl
A. How Poisoned is the Tree?
'A simple rule applies: the more serious the violation, the more
poisoned the tree. Thinking about it in terms of size, the more
126. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
127. Of course, a piece of evidence that is the poisoned fruit of an earlier illegality may
also itself represent a primary taint. In other words, the fruit of a poisoned tree
may itself be another poisoned tree. If so, a defendant with standing to challenge
the new primary taint may do so even if she has no standing to challenge the
earlier illegality. For example, suppose law enforcement officials arrest A ille-
gally (no probable cause) and then question him illegally (no Miranda warnings).
A gives up B. The police then illegally arrest B (no probable cause) and then
question him illegally (no Miranda warnings). B has no standing to challenge the
poisoned tree running from A. As such, B cannot challenge the introduction of
his statement as a fruit of that poisoned tree. On the other hand, B does have
standing to challenge his own poisoned tree--the illegal arrest and questioning of
him-in its own right and without regard to its connection to an illegality running
to A.
128. Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Brown v. illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
129. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
130. See, e.g., id.
131. Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982).
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poisoned the tree, the larger the tree is. A tree may be very poisoned
(very large) because the category of constitutional violation is high on
the hierarchy of fourth amendment (or other constitutional) viola-
tions, because several violations occurred at once, or because, no mat-
ter where the category of fourth amendment violation sits on the
hierarchy, the law enforcement officer's conduct in committing the vi-
olation was particularly egregious. A rough hierarchy of fourth
amendment violations (by category from least to most serious or, in
other words, by category from acorn to mighty oak) is as follows:
1. A stop made in public unsupported by reasonable suspicion;
2. A warrantless arrest on probable cause made in the home in violation
of the Payton requirement that a warrant be obtained for nonemergency in-
home arrests;
1 3 2
3. A seizure of an item in plain view but where there is no probable cause
to suspect the criminality of the item;
4. A search of premises supported by probable cause but without warrant
or exception to the warrant requirement;
5. An arrest made in public unsupported by probable cause;
6. A frisk unsupported by reasonable suspicion;
7. A protective sweep of a home unsupported by reasonable suspicion and
outside the area covered by the search incident to arrest exception;
8. A search of a place other than a private home unsupported either by
probable cause or warrant (or warrant exception);
9. A warrantless search of a person when supported by probable cause;
10. A search of a private home unsupported by either probable cause or a
warrant (or warrant exception);
11. A search of a person unsupported either by probable cause or a war-
rant (or warrant exception);
12. A body cavity search unsupported by either probable cause or a war-
rant (or warrant exception).
Combined with a hierarchy of violations by category is the conduct
of law enforcement officers in committing a particular violation.
Breaking into a locked office, particularly at night, with neither war-
rant nor probable cause is a more egregious violation (a larger tree)
than an office entry achieved by knocking on a closed door and then
entering without consent. The at-night break-in of the office may
even be as serious a fourth amendment violation as a search that by
classification is more serious but which was conducted in a less egre-
gious fashion (as, for example, a warrantless search of the person on
probable cause that involved no force and was effected during
daylight).
B. How Far From the Tree?
How far away in time and place the fruit must be before the taint
132. New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990). Frankly, I would have placed this viola-
tion a little higher on my hierarchy. I moved it down based on the Court's opin-
ion in Harris.
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of the tree is dissipated is the most difficult factor for which to provide
criteria outside the context of a particular factual setting since this
factor primarily is dependent on the nature of the violation. A return
to the above-provided rough equation of the size of the tree with the
degree of seriousness of the violation may help explain the Court's
treatment of attenuation.
Visualize a tree on the horizon that looks two inches high. The
closer a person is to the tree, the smaller the tree need be in actuality
to look two inches high to the person observing it. Conversely, the
farther a person is from the tree, the larger the tree need be in actual-
ity to look the same two inches high to the person observing it. Trans-
late the experience with trees on the horizon to the law of attenuation.
Assume that the Court has a rough view that sufficient attenuation is
achieved when a violation looks to an observer to be the equivalent of
two inches high. Then, as with trees on the horizon, the more serious
the violation, the more distant the fruit must be from the tree before
the taint is dissipated.
Although clearly the question of how much must occur to attenu-
ate is fact-dependent, two things nonetheless may be said with some
degree of confidence. First, physical evidence obtained from a search
incident to an illegal arrest is too close in time ever to be admissible.
Second, Miranda warnings by themselves will not sufficiently dissi-
pate the taint of an arrest unsupported by probable cause to make ad-
missible a statement made subsequent and reasonably proximate to
that arrest.-33
C. What Type of Fruit?
There is a difference between physical evidence discovered by the
police and information or evidence that is acquired through question-
ing of a person. 3 4 While physical evidence has no choice but to
"speak," a person may refuse. Evidence that comes from questioning
someone, even though that person has been identified or found only
because of the primary illegality, thus likely never will require more
attenuation than physical evidence that comes to light from the same
initial illegality and is equally distant from that illegality. It is even
possible that third person information today always is sufficiently
attenuated.
D. What Intervened?
Again visualize a tree on the horizon. There normally are objects
(hills, telephone poles, houses, cars, etc.) between the observer and the
tree. Some of these objects are large enough or opaque enough or situ-
133. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
134. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
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ated in a way that they block an observer's view of the tree; others are
not. As with objects between a tree on the horizon and an observer, so
too with factors that intervene between a poisoned tree and later dis-
covered fruit.
If later fruit (evidence) is provided by the defendant himself, then
intervening factors are (1) the giving of Miranda warnings, (2) the
defendant's consultation with a lawyer after the primary illegality,
(3) the willingness of the defendant to come forward to provide evi-
dence, (4) independent provoking incidents (a coconspirator con-
fessed; a witness came forward with information; independent of the
taint incriminating evidence is found) that may be said to have
spurred the defendant to provide information, (5) the length of time
between the illegality and the later acquisition of the defendant's evi-
dence. Willingness to provide information and passage of time from
the primary illegality also are relevant when the information comes
from someone other than the defendant.
VIII. ESCALATING CAUSE: ONE THING LEADS TO
ANOTHER
In evaluating a law enforcement officer's conduct under the fourth
amendment the sequence of events needs always to be considered. In-
formation derived at any particular stage constitutionally may be used
to permit additional intrusion that would have been unjustified by
what was known at the outset of a law enforcement encounter with a
suspect or at any earlier stage of law enforcement activity. In other
words, escalating cause means that information or evidence uncovered
at Stage 1 will justify law enforcement activity at Stage 2 that would
have been unconstitutional if done immediately at Stage 1.
Return to my earlier example in which Officer Experience sees
Sam Suspect driving in a car with the left rear light out. Officer Expe-
rience again stops Sam to give him a ticket and smells liquor on Sam's
breath. Again Sam takes and fails a sobriety test. This time, however,
Officer Experience does it right: when Sam fails the tests Officer Ex-
perience arrests him for driving while intoxicated.
As in the earlier rendition of this hypothetical, Officer Experience
then conducts a search of Sam's person and the interior of the car,
finds the customer list, the two sawed-off shotguns, drug parapherna-
lia, the box of glassine envelopes, and the suitcase full of cocaine. As
before, he then opens the trunk of the car and finds a gun and three
more suitcases filled with cocaine.
At the suppression hearing Officer Experience again testifies that
at no time was he in fear of Sam nor had he any reason to suspect that
Sam carried weapons or was dangerous.
Certainly at the initiation of the encounter between Officer Expe-
rience and Sam there was no authority to arrest Sam and no probable
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cause or reasonable suspicion to suspect that Sam was driving while
intoxicated or that he carried weapons or drugs either on his person or
in his car. At the time of the stop a Terry frisk would have been ille-
gal since there was no reason to suspect danger to the officer. Once
Sam failed the sobriety tests, Officer Experience then had probable
cause to believe that Sam was driving while intoxicated. He then ar-
rested Sam-a good arrest-and that triggered a permissible search
incident to arrest of Sam's person and the interior of the car. The
search of the car's trunk, however, could not be justified on a search
incident to arrest rationale. After what turned up on the search inci-
dent to arrest, however, there likely was probable cause to support the
search of the car's trunk.
The sequence of events, and the cause that escalated at each stage
with additional information obtained, operated to make admissible all
the evidence found.
The above example illustrates that in considering the constitution-
ality of a fourth amendment intrusion (or in considering whether on
the facts there was an intrusion) an attempt must be made to dissect
what occurred at each stage of the law enforcement/citizen encounter,
to focus on the level of cause the law enforcement officer had at that
particular stage, and to evaluate what he did next in light of the infor-
mation he had at that stage. This task may not be easy.135 At the very
least there likely will be a factfinding necessary to resolve a conflict in
the evidence as to what transpired, and when.
IX. CONCLUSION
The law of search and seizure is constantly evolving, can be quite
complicated, and is often confusing. What is provided in this Article is
a straightforward, expositional guide to dealing with fourth amend-
ment issues that hopefully will serve as a practitioner's primer on the
present status of search and seizure law.
135. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
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